INTRODUCTION
Arguments and counter-arguments about the superiority of infantry and tanks, or vice versa, are essentially futile, for the two arms are complementary and the real problem is not to decide between them but to effectively combine them together.
1 FM 3-0 Operations, the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, states that combined arms is "the synchronization or simultaneous application of several arms--such as infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation--to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each was used against the enemy in sequence."
2 The use of combined arms creates dilemmas for the enemy force. Often what the enemy force must do to protect itself from the effects of one arm will make it vulnerable to the effects of another. 3 For example, in a combined arms assault of a prepared position conducted by tanks, infantry and supporting artillery, the enemy infantry and vehicles could remain in their dug in positions in order to protect themselves from the supporting tank and artillery fires. This would, however, leave the enemy force vulnerable to the attacking infantry. Conversely, if the enemy infantrymen and vehicles moved out of their prepared positions in order to protect themselves from the attacking infantry, they would then be exposed to the effects of the tank and artillery fires. 4 The concept of combined arms is a cornerstone of U.S. Army doctrine and is deemed critical to the success any tactical operation. Army, 1998) , page 3-60. been more successful than others. The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate the Army's current method of integration.
In 1943, Lieutenant General McNair, the Commander of U.S. Army Ground Forces, wrote a memorandum to the Chief of the Armored Force about the use of armored forces. In that memorandum Lieutenant General McNair identified two distinct roles for armored forces on the battlefield:
The Battle of El Alamein demonstrated the correct employment of armor, which was held in reserve until the infantry, artillery and air had opened a hole. The British armor then exploited the success and destroyed the German force. Thus, we need large armor units to exploit the success of our infantry. We need small armored units also, in order to assist the infantry locally. 5 The first role mentioned in the memorandum, the role of exploitation by large armored units, has historically been filled by the armored or heavy division. The armor force has at times dedicated too great a portion of its assets towards supporting this role. The second role mentioned by Lieutenant General McNair, the role of infantry support, has been conducted by small armored units organic or attached to infantry divisions. The armor force has at times dedicated too small a portion of its resources to performing this role. The thesis argued in this monograph is that the U.S. Army's armor force is currently out of balance because it is providing too few resources towards supporting the Army's infantry divisions.
METHODOLOGY
This monograph examines the organizational, doctrinal and training issues associated with armored force integration with infantry divisions in the U.S. Army. The first chapter of the monograph describes, in very broad terms, combined arms integration of armored units with infantry. The second chapter examines the period between 1940 and 1947 in which the Army increased integration between its armored and infantry units in order to provide a basis for comparison with the Army's current method of integration. The third chapter explores the changes in the U.S. Army from the 1980s to the present in order to provide an understanding of how the U.S. Army currently integrates armored and infantry forces. The fourth chapter of the monograph evaluates the effectiveness of the Army's current method of integrating armored and infantry forces and the fifth chapter provides recommendations based on the previous four chapters.
INTEGRATION DEFINED
Commanders can integrate armored and infantry units in a myriad of combinations. In order to provide focus, this monograph examines the integration of armored units within the U.S.
Army's basic large fighting unit: the infantry division. Since there have been several types of infantry divisions and several types of armored units that have organized with them, some further discussion is required.
During World War II, the measure of the Army's ability to integrate armored units with infantry divisions was fairly simple to define. The line between armored units and infantry units was clear. The Army fielded sixty-six standard infantry divisions, five airborne-infantry divisions and one mountain infantry division. During World War II, armored forces included both armored infantry and tank units. Any attachment of armored forces to a standard, airborne or mountain division constituted integration. In practice, however, only tank battalions (as opposed to armored infantry battalions) were attached to infantry divisions. Consequently, the measure of integration of armored units with infantry divisions during World War II was almost wholly defined by the Army's ability to attach tank battalions to infantry divisions. 6 This continued to be the primary measure of integration up until the Army of Excellence changes of the 1980s.
6 Shelby L. Stanton, Order of Battle U.S. Army World War II, (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1984) , pages 75-186. Currently there are four types of U.S. Army infantry divisions: mechanized infantry, airborne infantry, air assault infantry and light infantry. The U.S. Army's current mechanized infantry division contains a combination of mechanized infantry and tank battalions. This makes the mechanized infantry division far more similar, organizationally, to the World War II armored division than to the World War II standard infantry division. Consequently, the mechanized infantry division cannot be used to measure the effectiveness of armored integration with an infantry division simply because it is, for all intents and purposes, an armored division. It is an infantry division, largely, in name only. In contrast, the airborne infantry, air assault infantry and light infantry divisions contain nine infantry battalions and are true infantry divisions. Any current evaluation of the Army's effectiveness in integrating armored units with infantry divisions must then be limited to the evaluation of integration with respect to these three types of divisions.
Because the Army has expanded the role of mechanized infantry since the end of World War II, it has more options in the organization of armored forces with infantry divisions. During World War II, commanders achieved integration through the attachment of tank battalions to infantry divisions. Currently, with the expanded role of the mechanized infantry, a commander can organize tank or mechanized infantry forces to infantry divisions in a number of different ways. These options include the attachment of tank battalions, mechanized infantry battalions or task forces composed of both tank and mechanized infantry companies. Consequently, the organization of tank or mechanized infantry battalion task forces with airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions constitutes integration in today's Army.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGIN OF THE GHQ TANK BATTALION
Of special importance has been the work of the tank battalions attached to infantry divisions...Throughout the entire campaign the infantry has been the major decisive element in the advance...It is team play which has assured success.
1
Lieutenant General Jacob Devers During 1940, General Headquarters (GHQ) U.S. Army made three critical organizational decisions that would shape the initial development of the armored-infantry integration in the U.S.
Army during World War II.
Firstly, GHQ adopted the triangular infantry division in June 1940 as the standard U.S. Army infantry division (Refer to figure 2-1).
2 The division was streamlined and strategically deployable. The division's combat power lay in its three infantry regiments and its supporting divisional artillery. GHQ judged that these two components would be required in all types of terrain and in all types of tactical situations. GHQ deliberately left additional combat and combat support assets out of the divisional structure reasoning that these non-organic elements would only be required for specific circumstances.
Secondly, GHQ established the "pooling" system in order to complement the triangular division. The pooling system, whose main proponent was the GHQ chief of staff, Brigadier As part of the pooling system, the GHQ and the Armored Force activated an armored group headquarters to control the four mobilized GHQ battalions. In concept, the armored group headquarters was to supervise and train three to five GHQ battalions (See Figure 2- to be unbalanced; they had too many tank battalions and too few infantry battalions to overcome combined arms defenses. 9 Concurrently in Europe and Africa the British, German and Soviet armies were demonstrating an increasingly lethal anti-tank capability with improved anti-tank guns and anti-tank mines.
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As a result of the tank's increasing vulnerability, GHQ directed the reorganization of the armored division and began to reconsider the number of armored divisions it would need to prosecute the war. The biggest change to the armored division's structure was the decrease of the tank to infantry ratio within the armored division. The third factor was the number of infantrymen in the armored division relative to the number of tanks. The armored division still was too tank heavy and still had problems fighting better balanced combined arms formations. The failure of tank-infantry integration in 1943 was a problem that had to be solved by both the deployed units and the units awaiting deployment or still mobilizing in the United States.
ASCENDANCY OF THE GHQ TANK BATTALION
Deployed units from the battalion level all the way up to the U.S. 5th Army completed and disseminated after action reports often focusing on tank-infantry integration and recommending solutions to problems in training and execution. Consequently, deployed commanders directed combined tank-infantry training during lulls in the action. corps commanders to conduct combined training with infantry divisions and GHQ tank battalions. The GHQ tank battalions were to attach to the infantry divisions for periods not exceeding two months to accomplish this. The directive also specified that tank companies and platoons should train in close cooperation with small units of infantry. 23 Although these directives implied improvement in tank-infantry integration, the demands of the war often disrupted the training of the infantry divisions. The newly mobilized divisions were often forced to provide individual replacements to deployed units, conducted training at only partial strength and had maneuvers cancelled or shortened. 24 Consequently, most infantry divisions and GHQ tank battalions had to learn the hard lessons of tank-infantry integration during and after the Normandy Campaign.
FULL INTEGRATION
By the end of the Normandy Campaign, the U.S. Army began to achieve widespread and effective integration with its GHQ tank battalions and its infantry divisions. That integration was a requirement based on the complexity of the terrain and tactical skill of Normandy's German 
PENTOMIC AND ROAD: STATUS QUO IN INTEGRATION
In an effort to address perceived changes on the battlefield in the 1950s, the Army developed a significantly different divisional structure. Searching for a viable role for its divisions and trying to account for the impact of atomic weapons on the battlefield, the Army developed the Pentomic infantry division. In order to speed information flow, the division featured an increased span of control and a flattened command and control structure. The Pentomic infantry division replaced the three infantry regiments and the associated nine infantry battalions of the 1947 infantry division with five subordinate battle groups thus eliminating one echelon of command. This increased span of control also gave the Pentomic division a greater capability to disperse in order to counter the massive firepower associated with atomic weapons. A greatly dispersed division, planners reasoned, would present a poor target for an atomic weapon.
Though the Pentomic division was in many ways a radical departure, it retained the same mechanism as the 1947 division for the organization of tanks with its subordinate units. The
Pentomic infantry division contained a single tank battalion that had the capability to provide a tank company to each of the division's five battle groups. In the 1960s, the Army reorganized its divisions under the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) structure (See Figure 3-1) . 3 In a return to a more traditional structure, planners designed the ROAD divisions with three subordinate maneuver brigades. Each ROAD division contained a standard base of combat support and combat service support units. This allowed for the flexible organization of the division's combat battalions. The ROAD armored division was normally organized with five tank battalions and four mechanized battalions, the mechanized division was normally organized with seven mechanized infantry battalions and three tank battalions and the infantry division was normally organized with eight infantry battalions and two tank battalions. The airborne and air assault divisions were normally organized with nine airborne and air assault battalions, respectively.
These divisional organizations were not fixed, however. The unique aspect of the ROAD structure was that the infantry, mechanized infantry and armored divisions could be task organized with a varying number of infantry, mechanized infantry, and tank battalions based on any given situation. 4 This provided unit commanders great flexibility in organizing tank and 3 Ney, Evolution of the US Army Division 1939 -1968 Any major changes in the structure of the Army's tactical units had to account for the Army's central dilemma in the 1980s. This dilemma was the requirement to be prepared to both fight a high-intensity war as part of NATO and deploy contingency forces to other regional hot spots.
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The Army Chief of Staff, General E.C. Meyer, emphasized this point in his 1980 White Paper:
The most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980s is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe. The AOE transition for the contingency forces was more problematic than the conversion of the heavy force. General Starry, the TRADOC commander, had to revisit the same problem that Brigadier General McNair had to grapple with in his day. That problem was how to create a division that was strategically mobile yet lethal, tactically mobile and sustainable. In 1940, GHQ had erred on the side of strategic mobility adopting the triangular division because it could get to a combat zone with a minimal amount of sea-borne transport. Once it got to the combat zone, however, it almost invariably needed attachment of additional combat, combat support, and combat service support units to provide it the requisite combat power, tactical mobility and sustainability. Unfortunately for the U.S. Army in the 1980s, the basic relationship between strategic mobility and combat power, tactical mobility and sustainability had not changed significantly in the intervening forty years. Gains in strategic mobility still had to be paid for with losses in combat power, tactical mobility and sustainability.
Once again favoring strategic mobility, the Army created the light infantry divisions as part of the AOE transition in 1983. TRADOC primarily designed the new divisions to deploy quickly to hot spots in order to deter further escalation of a situation or to operate in a low-intensity environment. Though not primarily designed to do so, TRADOC planners envisioned that the light division could also operate in the mid-intensity or high-intensity environments. To operate in these environments, however, the division would require attachment of additional forces.
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On paper the light division was a marvel of efficiency. It was deployable by air in 461 sorties and had a higher tooth to tail ratio than any other division in the Army. 11 Like its World War II predecessor, the new division was triangular from top to bottom containing three infantry brigades consisting of three infantry battalions each (see figure 3-2) . 12 The streamlining of the ROAD infantry divisional structure came at a cost, however. The new light infantry division had a reduced divisional support command limiting significantly its sustainability and its ability accept attachment of additional forces without significant augmentation from corps assets.
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TRADOC planners also eliminated the tank battalions formerly associated with the ROAD infantry division from the light infantry division's structure. The shortcomings in the division's firepower were, however, mitigated by the addition of an aviation brigade. Airborne divisions through the AOE transition. Given the scale of the Army's changes in the other divisions, the changes in the air assault and airborne division were relatively small. Both divisions retained more firepower and a slightly greater logistical capability than the light infantry divisions. The greater firepower within these divisions also made them less dependent on attachment of additional combat assets. The 82 nd Airborne Division additionally retained its organic airborne tank battalion (see figure 3-3) . 14 This additional capability came at the cost of strategic mobility, however. The airborne and air assault divisions required more than twice the number of sorties to deploy as a light infantry division required.
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HEAVY AND LIGHT FORCE INTEGRATION
As the Army began to consider these new AOE divisional structures, its leaders quickly determined that the divisions did not operate with equal effectiveness in all types of terrain. The AOE heavy divisions lacked the infantry to effectively operate in heavily wooded, mountainous and urbanized terrain. This led to a debate among the Army's leadership and in the professional Europe and elsewhere. 16 Conversely, the combining of heavy forces with the light infantry division was considered a requirement for most contingencies. With the proliferation of mechanized forces to third world nations, the light infantry division would be too light for the vast majority of situations and would almost invariably require attachment of heavy forces to operate in even the mid-intensity environment.
17
Organizationally, however, the Army had made it more difficult than ever to provide armored forces to its infantry divisions. The Army had eliminated both structures by which infantry divisions had historically received tank and mechanized support. Firstly, the Army had eliminated the pooling system in 1947 and with it the pool of tank or mechanized battalions specifically organized and trained to support the infantry divisions. Secondly, the AOE structure had, with the exception of the 82 nd Airborne Division's tank battalion, eliminated the organic tank support from the infantry divisions. 16 Romjue, 
AOE CHANGES IN PERSPECTIVE
The requirement to be prepared to fight two fundamentally different types of wars had a profound influence on the organizational development of the U.S. Army's divisions during the 1980s. Given the Army's commitment to both Central Europe and worldwide contingency operations, the Army of Excellence changes were appropriate. The changes provided a more capable heavy division, which accounted for the Army's commitment to NATO and a light infantry division, which provided a rapid deployment capability for contingency operations.
These changes ultimately widened the gap between the Army's "heavy" divisions and its remaining infantry divisions, however. This gap created organizational, doctrinal and training challenges for the Army, which made it more difficult for unit commanders to integrate armored units with infantry divisions. Although the AOE transition was a very positive change for the Army as a whole, it had the additional result of dismantling much of the integration of armored and infantry units forged during the 1940s and maintained through the 1970s.
CHAPTER FOUR
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
This monograph has identified three factors that are critical to measuring the effectiveness of The pooling method of organizing armored battalions with infantry divisions consisted of attaching tank battalions from the GHQ pool to infantry divisions requiring armored support. The major advantage of this method was that it employed armored units trained to provide close support to infantry divisions. The GHQ tank battalions did not have to be proficient at both the tasks associated with the support of an infantry division and those associated with being part of an armored division. Since no GHQ tank battalions were task organized with armored divisions during World War II, the GHQ tank battalions could devote their training time to perfecting the tasks associated with infantry support. 3 The major disadvantage of this method was that it did not retain of habitual relationships between the supporting armored units and the supported infantry divisions. On that subject the Chief of the Armored Force, Lieutenant General Devers, wrote General Marshall in 1942:
Economy of force is not gained by having a lot of units in a reserve pool where they train individually, knowing little or nothing of the units they are going to fight with. It is much better to make them a part of a division or corps, even to the wearing of the same shoulder patch. If they are needed elsewhere in an emergency, they can be withdrawn easily from the division or corps and attached where they are needed. Economy of force and unity of command go together. You get little of either if you get a lot of attached units at the last moment. Team play comes only with practice. The development of the vital coordination and mutual understanding between tanks and infantry at all levels will be the natural outcome of being part of an integrated division team from the outset. Experience in combat in this theater has proved the need for tanks in sufficient strength, properly organized and integrated within the division itself are vital to enable the division to attain its goal, of success in battle.
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The organic method had the same advantages as the semi-permanent attachment method had.
These were the employment of specialized armored units and the maintenance of habitual relationships between supporting and supported units. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
The Army has written two basic types of doctrine on the employment of armored units in The best manual with respect to armored integration with infantry divisions written since the Army of Excellence transition was, however, the three hundred page FM 17-18 Light Armor Operations. The Armor Center wrote this manual specifically to support the 82nd Airborne Division's tank battalion. This manual discussed, in-depth, the unique aspects of tank platoons, tank companies and tank battalions that were designed to provide close support to infantry battalions, brigades and divisions. Unfortunately for the Army, this well written manual became obsolete when the Army inactivated the 82nd Airborne Division's tank battalion in 1997.
EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT TRAINING
Unlike the previous assessments of organization and doctrine, the U.S. 
CONCLUSIONS
It is believed that our 1943 troop basis has entirely too many armored divisions, considering their tactical employment, and too few GHQ tank battalions. It is particularly important that the latter be made available in quantities to permit all infantry divisions to work with them freely and frequently. 2 The Army's current system requires the armored battalions within the heavy divisions to be proficient at tasks associated with both the armored and the infantry division. These roles are, however, fundamentally different in terms of tempo, tactics, techniques and procedures.
The Army needs to revert to either the organic or the semi-permanent attachment method of organizing armored units with its infantry divisions in order to allow armored units to specialize in one role or the other. The Army should do this even at the expense of the existing heavy forces.
In a clear move towards the organic method of organization, the Army has begun the development of two Initial Brigades. Although the Army will equip these brigades with armored vehicles, their character will be different than either the armored or the mechanized infantry brigade. These brigades are true infantry brigades with infantry at the heart of the organization.
TRADOC has organized these brigades with three infantry battalions each composed of three infantry companies. Each company will have a platoon of medium gun systems providing armored support to the lowest level.
example of this type of organization was the 82nd Airborne Division's light tank battalion, the 3rd Battalion 73rd Armor. Reverting to the semi-permanent attachment method of organization would require the Army to activate an armored group. This armored group would have to contain the appropriate number of armored battalions to provide support to the Army's infantry divisions.
These armored battalions would then have to be habitually associated with specific infantry divisions.
The added benefit of adopting the organic or semi-permanent attachment method of organization is that it would also overcome the central problem with the current heavy-light and light-heavy training conducted at the Army's combat training centers. That problem is the lack of habitual relationships between the supporting armored units and the supported infantry divisions.
The current system organizes available armored units with the training infantry units based on the most efficient throughput of battalions. 5 The organic and semi-permanent attachment methods of organization would provide habitual relationships and would allow the units to train according to their wartime task organization in accordance with the current training doctrine. 
